The devastating fire at Grenfell Tower in 2017 served as a stark reminder of the grave deficiencies within the construction industry, particularly concerning building safety regulations, construction practices, and fire safety measures. The Phase 2 final report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, released on 4 September 2024, meticulously examines these critical issues. It proffers a comprehensive set of recommendations aimed at reforming the construction industry to avert such catastrophes in the future.
Focus360 Energy: property compliance services – pre-planning to post-construction. Learn more.
A pivotal finding of the inquiry was the fragmented approach to fire safety within both the government and the construction industry. To address this, the report advocates for the creation of key roles to streamline responsibilities and foster effective change. Central to this is the establishment of a Single Secretary of State for Fire Safety, a position designed to centralise fire safety functions within the government, ensuring more coordinated and efficacious policymaking. Additionally, the appointment of a Chief Construction Adviser, endowed with extensive practical experience in the construction sector, is recommended to provide expert counsel on all matters affecting the industry. Moreover, the establishment of a Construction Regulator to oversee a single independent body responsible for the regulation, testing, and certification of construction products, building control, and the licensing of contractors for higher-risk buildings (HRBs) is proposed.
The current definition of HRBs, predicated on criteria such as height and the number of residential units, was found to be arbitrary by the inquiry. The report calls for an urgent review of this definition to encompass factors such as the building’s use and the presence of vulnerable occupants. Such a redefinition could significantly broaden the spectrum of buildings subject to stringent regulations, thereby enhancing safety but also imposing additional demands on the regulatory system.
The inquiry also underscored the necessity for better regulation and accountability among construction professionals. It recommends the introduction of a licensing scheme for principal contractors, overseen by a construction regulator, for those working on HRBs. This scheme would necessitate a senior manager to provide a personal undertaking to ensure the building’s safety upon completion. Further, the inquiry suggests that the Architects Registration Board and the Royal Institute of British Architects review their training programmes to align with the inquiry’s findings, thereby improving education and training for architects. The formal recognition of fire engineers, regulated by an independent body, is another key recommendation, with a group of experts defining the requisite competencies. Additionally, the establishment of a mandatory accreditation system for fire risk assessors is proposed, ensuring that they meet high standards of qualification and continuous professional development.
Statutory guidance in Approved Document B (ADB) was found wanting. The inquiry recommends a thorough review and revision of ADB to clarify that it merely serves as guidance and not a definitive statement of legal requirements. This revision should also address the assumption that effective compartmentation justifies a “stay put” strategy, particularly in buildings that have undergone overcladding.
Enhancements to the “Gateways” building control regime for HRBs are also suggested. Notably, it recommends additional documentation at Gateway 2, including a fire safety strategy by a registered fire engineer, a statement from the principal designer, and a personal undertaking from the principal contractor. The fire safety strategy should also be reviewed and resubmitted upon the building’s completion at Gateway 3.
The inquiry revealed that commercial interests often conflicted with building control functions, thereby compromising public safety. To mitigate this, it recommends that the government appoint an independent panel to consider whether building control should be performed by a national authority rather than entities with commercial interests. Moreover, the development of new test methods to provide reliable information for assessing fire safety is called for, along with the recommendation that the construction regulator be responsible for assessing the conformity of construction products and issuing certificates that include all relevant test results and the full testing history of the product.
The report also emphasises the need for the government to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations and their responses, complete with annual reporting to Parliament, to ensure accountability. This is in response to the inquiry’s revelation that previous recommendations on fire safety were frequently ignored by the government.
The Phase 2 final report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry delineates an exhaustive roadmap for transforming the construction industry to prioritise safety and accountability. The implementation of these recommendations will necessitate substantial effort and coordination, yet they are indispensable steps towards preventing another tragedy akin to Grenfell Tower. The government’s response to these recommendations will be crucial in shaping the future landscape of building safety in the UK.
Be the first to comment