Higher-Risk Buildings: Regulatory Framework, Design Implications, and Compliance Challenges

Abstract

The catastrophic Grenfell Tower fire in June 2017 served as an urgent and profound global wake-up call, irrevocably highlighting deep-seated systemic failures in the fire safety and regulatory oversight of high-rise residential buildings. This tragedy, which claimed 72 lives, instigated a comprehensive and unprecedented re-evaluation of building safety legislation across the United Kingdom. In direct response, the UK government introduced the landmark Building Safety Act 2022, a piece of legislation designed to establish a significantly more stringent and coherent regulatory framework specifically for Higher-Risk Buildings (HRBs). This extensive report meticulously examines the multi-faceted definition of HRBs, delves into the intricate regulatory requirements and comprehensive approval processes meticulously managed by the newly established Building Safety Regulator (BSR), and explores the profound implications these changes impose upon the entire lifecycle of these structures – from conceptual design and rigorous construction through to their meticulous ongoing management. Furthermore, the report critically analyses the historical context that led to these reforms, dissects the expansive powers vested in the BSR, and addresses the complex legal and compliance challenges that now confront all professionals intrinsically involved in the design, construction, and stewardship of HRB projects.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

1. Introduction

The inferno that engulfed Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017 transcended a mere incident; it represented a calamitous failure of a fragmented regulatory system, an insufficient enforcement regime, and a culture of complacency that permeated aspects of the construction industry. The fire, tragically responsible for 72 fatalities and numerous injuries, laid bare severe deficiencies in existing building safety regulations, particularly in relation to the design, construction, and management of high-rise residential buildings. The scale of the tragedy and the public outcry that followed created an irrefutable imperative for fundamental change, leading to the establishment of Dame Judith Hackitt’s independent review and, subsequently, the enactment of the Building Safety Act 2022. This transformative legislation aims to comprehensively overhaul building safety standards, embedding a robust and proactive regulatory framework for HRBs that prioritises the safety of residents above all else. This report embarks on an in-depth exploration of the criteria defining HRBs, delineates the dramatically reshaped regulatory landscape overseen by the BSR, and meticulously examines the manifold challenges faced by built environment professionals in ensuring strict adherence to these enhanced and legally binding safety standards.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

2. Historical Context of Building Safety Regulation in the UK

To fully appreciate the transformative nature of the Building Safety Act 2022, it is essential to contextualise it within the historical evolution of building safety regulation in the UK. The journey from a reactive, prescriptive approach to a proactive, outcome-focused one has been protracted and, tragically, punctuated by avoidable disasters.

2.1 The Pre-Grenfell Regulatory Landscape: Fragmentation and Self-Regulation

The foundation of modern building regulation in the UK rests primarily on the Building Act 1984, which empowered the Secretary of State to make regulations for the health, safety, welfare, convenience, and energy efficiency of persons in and around buildings. This Act established a system where compliance with ‘Building Regulations’ was overseen by ‘building control bodies’. Historically, this oversight was shared between local authority building control departments and, since 1985, ‘Approved Inspectors’, who were private sector entities accredited to carry out building control functions. This dual system introduced an element of market competition, which, in some critiques, was perceived to incentivise a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of regulatory rigour, rather than a race to the top for safety standards.

Approved Document B, ‘Fire Safety’, was the primary guidance document supporting the Building Regulations regarding fire safety. It provided prescriptive requirements and functional guidance, but its interpretation often became a point of contention. The design of external wall systems, particularly the selection of cladding materials and insulation, was an area where the prescriptive guidance proved insufficient or was misinterpreted, allowing the widespread use of combustible materials on high-rise residential buildings (House of Commons Library, 2022).

The pre-Grenfell regulatory regime was often characterised by its reliance on a ‘lighter touch’ approach, placing significant responsibility on duty holders for self-certification and demonstrating compliance. While this was intended to foster innovation and efficiency, it often led to a lack of clear accountability, fragmented information management, and insufficient oversight, particularly for complex high-rise structures where multiple contractors and subcontractors might contribute to a project without a single, overarching authority responsible for the building’s holistic safety performance.

2.2 Precursors to Tragedy: Warnings Unheeded

The Grenfell Tower fire, while unprecedented in its scale for modern UK history, was not the first fire to expose significant deficiencies in high-rise building safety. The Lakanal House fire in Southwark in 2009, which killed six residents, and the Shirley Towers fire in Southampton in 2010, which claimed the lives of two firefighters, both highlighted critical issues with fire compartmentation, external cladding systems, and emergency procedures. Inquests and investigations following these fires issued numerous recommendations, many of which echoed concerns later raised by the Grenfell inquiry. For instance, the Lakanal House inquest explicitly called for a review of fire safety guidance relating to external cladding materials (Coroners’ Inquest, Lakanal House, 2013). However, despite these warnings and the persistent lobbying efforts from fire safety experts and advocacy groups, comprehensive legislative reform remained elusive. The fragmented nature of the existing regulatory system, coupled with perceived political and industrial inertia, meant that fundamental changes were not implemented, setting the stage for the catastrophic events of 2017.

2.3 The Grenfell Tower Fire: A Catalyst for Change

The Grenfell Tower fire starkly demonstrated the profound consequences of these systemic failures. The rapid spread of fire up the building’s exterior, attributed primarily to the combustible Aluminium Composite Material (ACM) cladding and insulation, exposed critical flaws in material specification, product testing, regulatory oversight, and emergency response protocols (Grenfell Tower Inquiry, 2018-2023). The inquiry revealed a ‘systemic failure’ across the entire construction ecosystem, encompassing manufacturers, designers, contractors, building control bodies, and landlords. It highlighted a culture where cost-cutting sometimes overshadowed safety, where accountability was diffused, and where residents’ concerns were often dismissed. The sheer scale of the human tragedy and the extensive media coverage ensured that this event could not be ignored, making it an undeniable catalyst for fundamental and wide-ranging legislative reform.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

3. The Genesis of the Building Safety Act 2022

The immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire saw an urgent re-evaluation of building safety. This period culminated in the formation of the independent review led by Dame Judith Hackitt, whose recommendations formed the bedrock of the subsequent legislative changes.

3.1 Dame Judith Hackitt’s Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety

Appointed in July 2017, Dame Judith Hackitt was tasked with conducting an ‘Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety’. Her final report, ‘Building a Safer Future’, published in May 2018, delivered a searing critique of the existing regulatory regime. Its key findings were damning:

• Systemic Failure: The report concluded that the current system for ensuring fire safety in high-rise and complex buildings was ‘not fit for purpose’ and amounted to a ‘systemic failure’.
• Culture of Complacency: Hackitt identified a ‘race to the bottom’ where industry participants prioritised cost and speed over safety, leading to ambiguous responsibilities and insufficient oversight.
• Lack of Clarity and Accountability: There was a profound lack of clarity on roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities across the lifecycle of a building, leading to diffused liability when things went wrong.
• Inadequate Enforcement: The existing enforcement mechanisms were deemed insufficient to deter non-compliance.
• Insufficient Competence: There was a widespread lack of demonstrable competence across various roles within the industry.
• Fragmented Information: Critical safety information was often lost or fragmented during design, construction, and handover, making effective ongoing management virtually impossible.

In response to these findings, the Hackitt Review put forward a series of fundamental recommendations that aimed to establish a new, robust, and holistic regulatory framework. These included (Hackitt, 2018):

• A new regulatory body: A stronger, more proactive regulator with clear responsibilities and powers.
• Clear accountability: Identifying specific duty holders with explicit responsibilities for building safety at every stage.
• A ‘golden thread’ of information: A digital, comprehensive, and continuously updated record of building safety information.
• A ‘gateway’ approach: Key points in the design and construction process where regulatory approval must be secured before proceeding.
• Enhanced competence: A requirement for demonstrable competence for all involved in the design, construction, and management of HRBs.
• Stronger resident voice: Greater empowerment and engagement of residents in building safety matters.

3.2 The Legislative Journey: From White Paper to Act

The Hackitt Review’s recommendations formed the blueprint for the government’s subsequent legislative agenda. The journey from initial proposals to enacted law involved several stages:

1. Consultations and White Paper: Extensive public consultations were held, leading to the publication of the ‘Building a Safer Future’ White Paper in April 2020, outlining the government’s proposals for legislative reform, including the establishment of the BSR and the new regulatory regime (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2020).
2. Building Safety Bill Introduction: The Building Safety Bill was introduced to Parliament in July 2020, undergoing detailed scrutiny and debate across both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The Bill was subject to various amendments as it progressed, reflecting stakeholder feedback and political considerations.
3. Royal Assent: The Building Safety Bill received Royal Assent on 28 April 2022, officially becoming the Building Safety Act 2022. While receiving Royal Assent, many of its provisions required secondary legislation to bring them into force, indicating a phased implementation approach that has continued through 2023 and 2024.

This legislative journey underscored the national commitment to rectifying the systemic failures exposed by Grenfell and establishing a new era of building safety in the UK.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

4. Definition of Higher-Risk Buildings (HRBs)

The Building Safety Act 2022 introduces a legally precise and significant classification for Higher-Risk Buildings, which determines the application of the Act’s enhanced regulatory regime. Understanding this definition is paramount for all stakeholders in the built environment.

4.1 Criteria for Classification

Under the Building Safety Act 2022, a HRB is primarily defined as a building in England that meets specific height/storey criteria and usage requirements (gov.uk, 2023b; Designing Buildings, 2023a):

• Height/Storey Threshold: The building must be at least 18 meters in height or have at least seven storeys. This threshold is critical. The ’18 meters’ measurement is taken from the lowest ground level adjoining the building to the finished floor level of the top storey, excluding any rooftop plant rooms or structures. The ‘seven storeys’ count includes all above-ground storeys, irrespective of their use, but excludes underground levels. This specific threshold is often linked to the operational capabilities of fire and rescue services, where above this height, external firefighting becomes significantly more challenging, necessitating greater reliance on internal fire safety measures, sprinkler systems, and robust structural integrity. These buildings are typically occupied by a larger number of people, leading to more complex evacuation strategies in the event of an emergency.

• Residential Units: The building must contain at least two residential units. This criterion is crucial for differentiating HRBs from single residential dwellings or purely commercial buildings that do not house permanent residents. A ‘residential unit’ can be an apartment, a flat, or any self-contained dwelling within the building. This stipulation ensures that buildings where a community of individuals resides, thereby increasing potential risks and management complexities, fall within the scope of the Act.

• Specific Occupancy Types: Additionally, care homes and hospitals that meet the same height or storey criteria are also classified as HRBs. This inclusion recognises the heightened vulnerability of occupants within these facilities, who may have limited mobility, cognitive impairments, or be otherwise dependent on staff for evacuation, thereby necessitating the highest standards of structural and fire safety. The complexity of managing fire incidents and ensuring the safety of patients and residents in such environments demands the rigorous oversight provided by the BSR.

It is important to note that the definition of HRBs applies both to new buildings under construction and to existing buildings that meet the criteria. For existing buildings, this means they are subject to the ongoing safety management and ‘accountable person’ duties, necessitating retrospective compliance efforts where deficiencies are identified.

4.2 Exclusions from HRB Classification

While the Act aims for broad coverage of higher-risk structures, certain building types are specifically excluded from HRB classification, primarily due to their unique operational characteristics, existing bespoke safety regimes, or transient occupancy (gov.uk, 2023c):

• Secure Residential Institutions: This category includes prisons, detention centres, and other custodial facilities. These buildings operate under highly specific and often confidential security and safety protocols that are distinct from standard residential settings. Their design, construction, and management are already governed by stringent internal regulations and external oversight bodies that address their particular risks.

• Hotels: Hotels are excluded because they typically house a transient population rather than permanent residents. While fire safety is paramount in hotels, their management structures and emergency procedures (e.g., immediate evacuation rather than ‘stay put’ strategies) differ significantly from residential blocks. They are generally subject to existing comprehensive fire safety legislation, such as the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, which places duties on responsible persons for day-to-day fire risk management.

• Military Barracks and Ministry of Defence Accommodation: Buildings containing living accommodation provided by the Ministry of Defence for military personnel are excluded. Similar to secure institutions, these are often subject to distinct national security and defence regulations and internal departmental safety standards that are deemed sufficient for their specific context.

• Temporary Structures and Hostels: Although not explicitly listed in the core exclusions, the nuanced interpretation of ‘residential units’ and ‘permanent residence’ often means that temporary structures, hostels offering short-term accommodation, or buildings primarily used for tourism rather than long-term habitation may fall outside the HRB definition. However, their fire safety remains governed by broader building regulations and fire safety orders.

It is crucial for professionals to continually refer to the latest guidance and secondary legislation, as the precise definitions and exclusions may be subject to refinement or expansion over time, reflecting evolving understanding of risk and policy objectives.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

5. Regulatory Framework and the Role of the Building Safety Regulator

The cornerstone of the Building Safety Act 2022 is the establishment of the Building Safety Regulator (BSR), a powerful new body mandated to bring about a paradigm shift in building safety culture and practice. Its powers and responsibilities are extensive, encompassing the entire lifecycle of HRBs.

5.1 Establishment and Mandate of the Building Safety Regulator

The Building Safety Regulator (BSR) was formally established under the Building Safety Act 2022 and operates as part of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). This strategic placement leverages the HSE’s extensive experience in regulatory enforcement, investigation, and driving safety culture change across high-risk industries. The BSR’s primary mandate is to improve the safety and performance of HRBs, but it also extends to overseeing the safety of all buildings, promoting competence within the industry, and assisting and advising government on building safety matters (HSE, 2024).

Its overarching objectives include:

• Driving Culture Change: Moving the industry away from a ‘tick-box’ compliance mentality to one of continuous safety improvement and proactive risk management.
• Improving Competence: Raising standards of competence across all roles involved in the design, construction, and management of buildings.
• Ensuring Compliance: Implementing a robust and proportionate enforcement regime to ensure adherence to the Act and associated regulations.
• Acting as the Building Control Authority for HRBs: Taking on the direct regulatory oversight role for HRBs, providing a single, consistent point of contact and approval.

5.2 Powers and Responsibilities: The Three Gateway System and Beyond

The BSR’s responsibilities are multifaceted, ranging from the initial design stages of a building to its ongoing occupation and management. A central pillar of its regulatory approach is the ‘gateway’ system, designed to provide rigorous oversight at critical stages of a building’s lifecycle. Beyond the gateways, the BSR is also responsible for registering HRBs, assessing safety cases for occupied buildings, and driving the implementation of the ‘golden thread’ of information.

5.2.1 The Gateway System

The Act introduces a stringent three-gateway system that applies specifically to HRBs, fundamentally altering the traditional building control process:

• Gateway One (Planning Application Stage):

  • Purpose: This gateway ensures that building safety, particularly fire safety, is considered and embedded at the earliest possible stage of a project – during the planning application. It aims to prevent fundamental fire safety issues from being ‘designed in’ to a scheme, which are then costly and difficult to rectify later (gov.uk, 2023a).
  • Requirements: At this stage, applicants for HRBs must submit a comprehensive ‘fire statement’ alongside their planning application. This statement is not merely a formality; it must demonstrate that fire safety matters have been thoroughly considered and integrated into the proposed design. Key elements typically include details of the site layout, access for emergency services (e.g., fire engines, aerial appliances), water supply for firefighting, fire hydrants, and preliminary strategies for building evacuation and compartmentalisation. The fire statement also needs to consider the specific risks associated with the building’s proposed use and occupancy profile.
  • BSR’s Role: The BSR acts as a statutory consultee for local planning authorities for Gateway One applications concerning HRBs. It scrutinises the fire statement and planning proposals, challenging any aspects that may compromise building safety. The BSR can issue advice, request further information, or object to the planning application if it believes the fire safety considerations are inadequate. This early intervention is crucial for ensuring that the foundations of a safe building are established from the outset.

• Gateway Two (Pre-Construction Stage):

  • Purpose: This is arguably the most critical gateway, serving as a ‘hard stop’ before any significant construction work on an HRB can commence. Its objective is to ensure that a detailed and comprehensive building safety case has been developed and approved by the BSR, demonstrating that the proposed design and construction methods will meet the highest safety standards (Law Society, 2023).
  • Requirements: Before construction starts, the ‘client’ (the person for whom the building work is carried out) must submit an extensive application to the BSR for approval. This application must include:
    • Detailed plans and specifications for the building, including all fire and structural safety features.
    • A ‘construction control plan’ outlining how the building work will be managed and controlled to ensure compliance.
    • A ‘resident engagement strategy’ detailing how future residents will be involved in building safety matters.
    • A preliminary ‘fire and emergency file’ that will form part of the golden thread.
    • The proposed strategy for creating and maintaining the ‘golden thread’ of information throughout construction.
    • Detailed plans for managing risks associated with the proposed construction methods.
    • Declarations from the Principal Designer and Principal Contractor confirming their competence and adherence to their duties.
  • BSR’s Role: The BSR becomes the building control authority for HRBs at this stage, replacing traditional local authority or Approved Inspector oversight. It undertakes a thorough and forensic review of the submitted documents. The BSR has significant powers, including requesting extensive additional information, holding pre-application discussions, and conducting site visits. Commencing construction without explicit approval from the BSR is a criminal offence, carrying severe penalties. This gateway ensures that safety is designed into the building and that a robust plan for delivering that safety during construction is in place before ground is broken.

• Gateway Three (Completion and Occupation Stage):

  • Purpose: This final gateway acts as another ‘hard stop’ at the completion of building work. It ensures that the ‘as-built’ HRB aligns precisely with the plans approved at Gateway Two, that all safety systems are functional, and that the building is safe for occupation (Law Society, 2023).
  • Requirements: Upon completion of the works, the client must submit a comprehensive application for a completion certificate to the BSR. This application includes:
    • ‘As-built’ information, demonstrating that the construction accurately reflects the approved design.
    • A completed ‘golden thread’ of information, meticulously compiled throughout the design and construction phases, ready to be handed over to the ‘accountable person’.
    • Commissioning information for all safety-critical systems (e.g., sprinklers, smoke control, alarms).
    • A final declaration of compliance from the Principal Designer and Principal Contractor, confirming that they have fulfilled their duties and that the building is compliant with all relevant regulations.
    • Details of the proposed Accountable Person.
  • BSR’s Role: The BSR conducts a thorough review of the submitted documentation and may perform on-site inspections to verify compliance. Crucially, it is an offence for an HRB to be occupied before receiving a completion certificate from the BSR. This prevents occupation of buildings that have not been rigorously verified as safe, ensuring that the intentions of the design are realised in the physical structure.

5.2.2 Ongoing Management and Registration

Beyond the construction gateways, the BSR plays a continuous role in ensuring the safety of occupied HRBs:

• Registration of HRBs: All HRBs must be registered with the BSR before they can be legally occupied. This creates a comprehensive database of HRBs, enabling the BSR to track and regulate them effectively (brighthr.com, 2023). The deadline for registration for existing occupied HRBs was 1 October 2023, and unregistered buildings face potential enforcement action.

• Safety Case Assessment: For occupied HRBs, the BSR will proactively assess the ‘safety case’ report prepared by the ‘accountable person’ (AP). This involves a systematic review of how safety risks are being managed in occupied buildings, ensuring that the AP is fulfilling their ongoing duties. The BSR will have powers to demand improvements, issue enforcement notices, and ultimately prosecute non-compliance.

• Enforcement Powers: The BSR is vested with robust enforcement powers, including the ability to issue compliance notices, stop notices, and ultimately pursue prosecution for serious breaches of the Act. These powers are designed to ensure that building owners and managers take their safety responsibilities seriously.

The establishment of the BSR and its comprehensive regulatory framework marks a profound shift from a fragmented, often reactive, system to one that is proactive, integrated, and relentlessly focused on ensuring the highest standards of safety for HRBs throughout their entire lifecycle.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

6. Core Principles and Mechanisms of the Act

Beyond the BSR’s direct oversight, the Building Safety Act 2022 introduces several fundamental principles and mechanisms designed to embed a culture of safety, accountability, and continuous improvement across the built environment sector.

6.1 The Golden Thread of Information

The concept of the ‘golden thread’ is a cornerstone of the Act, directly addressing the pre-Grenfell issue of fragmented and lost building information. It represents a significant step towards digital transformation in construction and facilities management.

6.1.1 Meaning and Purpose

The ‘golden thread’ is defined as accurate, up-to-date, and accessible information about a building that is required to be held and maintained digitally, and made available to relevant people, throughout the building’s lifecycle, from design to demolition (Hackitt, 2018). Its core purpose is to:

• Ensure Continuity and Consistency: Prevent the loss of critical safety information as a project moves from design to construction, commissioning, and occupation, and through subsequent refurbishment cycles.
• Enhance Accountability: Provide a clear and undeniable record of decisions made, materials used, and changes implemented, allowing for clear accountability if safety issues arise.
• Support Operational Safety: Equip the Accountable Person with all necessary information to safely manage the building, understand its risks, and maintain its safety systems effectively.
• Facilitate Emergency Response: Provide emergency services with immediate access to crucial building information (e.g., floor plans, fire safety systems, hazardous materials) during an incident, potentially saving lives.
• Drive Compliance: Serve as the central repository for demonstrating compliance with regulatory requirements throughout the building’s life.

6.1.2 What Information It Comprises

The golden thread is a comprehensive digital record that includes, but is not limited to:

• Design Information: Approved plans, specifications, fire safety engineering reports, structural calculations, material specifications, and product certifications.
• Construction Information: ‘As-built’ drawings, quality assurance records, inspection reports, commissioning data for all building services and safety systems, records of changes and approvals during construction.
• Materials Information: Detailed specifications and certifications for all safety-critical materials, especially those in external wall systems, fire stopping, and structural elements.
• Maintenance and Operational Information: Manuals for plant and equipment, maintenance schedules, fire risk assessments, records of repairs and inspections, emergency plans, resident engagement strategies.
• Regulatory Approvals: Records of all gateway approvals, completion certificates, and BSR correspondence.

6.1.3 Challenges in Implementation

Implementing the golden thread presents significant challenges:

• Digitalisation: Requiring a robust digital infrastructure, common data environments, and consistent data standards across the industry.
• Interoperability: Ensuring different software systems and platforms can seamlessly exchange information.
• Data Management: The sheer volume and complexity of information necessitate sophisticated data management strategies and qualified personnel.
• Cost and Training: Significant upfront investment in technology, processes, and extensive training for all duty holders and their teams.
• Legacy Data: Integrating existing building information into a digital golden thread for older HRBs.

6.2 Duty Holders and Competence

The Act significantly strengthens the duties and responsibilities placed upon key roles involved in HRB projects, mirroring the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations (CDM) but with a specific focus on building safety. Crucially, these roles demand demonstrable competence.

6.2.1 New Duty Holder Roles (for New HRBs)

• Client: The organisation or individual for whom the construction project is carried out. The Client has primary responsibility for ensuring that adequate resources are provided, and that competent duty holders are appointed throughout the project lifecycle. They must ensure that the building is designed and constructed in a way that minimises building safety risks.
• Principal Designer: Appointed by the Client, the Principal Designer is responsible for planning, managing, and monitoring the design work during the pre-construction phase. Their expanded role under the BSA includes ensuring that building safety risks are eliminated or reduced during the design process, and that the design complies with all relevant regulations. They are instrumental in establishing the initial golden thread information.
• Principal Contractor: Appointed by the Client, the Principal Contractor is responsible for planning, managing, and monitoring the construction work. Their expanded duties include ensuring that construction complies with the approved design and building regulations, managing all construction safety risks, and rigorously contributing to the golden thread of information as the building is constructed.

6.2.2 Industry Competence Requirements

The Act places a legal duty on all duty holders to ensure that anyone they appoint to carry out work on an HRB is ‘competent’ to do so. This goes beyond mere qualifications, encompassing:

• Skills, Knowledge, Experience, and Behaviour (SKEB): Demonstrating the appropriate SKEB for the tasks they undertake.
• Organisational Capability: Organisations must also demonstrate that they have the necessary systems, processes, and resources to ensure their personnel are competent.
• Certification and Accreditation: The industry is developing new competence frameworks, accreditation schemes, and certification routes to help individuals and organisations demonstrate compliance (e.g., BSI Flex 8670, Building Safety Alliance). The BSR will oversee these competence arrangements.

6.3 Safety Case and Safety Case Report (for Occupied HRBs)

For occupied HRBs, the Act introduces the critical requirement for an ‘Accountable Person’ to prepare and maintain a ‘safety case report’.

6.3.1 Explanation and Purpose

A safety case is a comprehensive and structured demonstration that all reasonable steps have been taken to prevent building safety risks (specifically fire spread and structural collapse) from materialising and to mitigate their impact if they do occur. The ‘safety case report’ is the document that presents this evidence to the BSR (Law Society, 2023). Its purpose is to:

• Systematically Identify Risks: Provide a robust process for identifying, assessing, and understanding building safety risks within an occupied HRB.
• Demonstrate Mitigation: Detail the measures implemented to control and reduce these risks to an acceptable level.
• Outline Safety Management Systems: Describe the management systems, policies, procedures, and resources in place to ensure the ongoing safety of the building.
• Inform the BSR: Allow the BSR to assess whether the Accountable Person is effectively managing building safety risks and fulfilling their legal duties.

6.3.2 Contents of a Safety Case Report

A safety case report is a living document that typically includes:

• Building Information: Details from the golden thread relevant to fire and structural safety.
• Hazard Identification: Comprehensive identification of fire and structural hazards specific to the building.
• Risk Assessment: A detailed assessment of the likelihood and severity of those hazards, including an analysis of potential failure modes.
• Risk Control Measures: A description of all active and passive fire safety systems, structural maintenance plans, and operational procedures in place to mitigate risks.
• Safety Management System: An outline of the management structure, roles, responsibilities, competence arrangements, audit processes, and review mechanisms for building safety.
• Resident Engagement Strategy: How residents are informed and involved in building safety.
• Emergency Plans: Clear procedures for responding to fire and structural emergencies.
• Evidence of Review and Audit: How the safety case is regularly reviewed, updated, and independently audited.

6.3.3 BSR’s Assessment and Enforcement

The BSR will periodically call in safety case reports from Accountable Persons for assessment. This is a rigorous process, and the BSR has the power to challenge the report’s content, request further information, and even demand improvements to a building’s safety measures if the safety case is deemed inadequate. Failure to produce an adequate safety case, or to implement its recommendations, can lead to compliance notices, enforcement action, and potential prosecution, underscoring the serious legal implications for Accountable Persons.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

7. Implications for Design and Construction

The Building Safety Act 2022 fundamentally re-engineers the approach to designing and constructing Higher-Risk Buildings, demanding a holistic, proactive, and meticulously documented process where safety is paramount from concept to completion.

7.1 Design Considerations: Embedding Safety from Concept

Designing HRBs under the new regime requires a far more integrated and rigorous approach, moving beyond prescriptive compliance to a deep understanding of safety outcomes and risk mitigation.

• Fire Safety Engineering: While traditional passive fire protection measures (e.g., fire-resistant materials, compartmentalisation, fire doors) remain essential, the Act mandates a more sophisticated, holistic fire safety strategy. This involves extensive use of fire safety engineering principles, which may include:

  • Active Fire Protection Systems: Designing for advanced automatic fire detection and alarm systems, sprinkler and suppression systems, smoke control and ventilation systems, and emergency lighting systems. The reliability, maintenance, and interdependencies of these systems must be thoroughly documented.
  • Compartmentation and Sub-division: Ensuring robust fire compartmentation to limit fire spread horizontally and vertically, including meticulous attention to fire stopping at all service penetrations and junctions.
  • Evacuation Strategies: Designing for effective, safe, and accessible evacuation routes, considering specific challenges for vulnerable persons. This includes staircase widths, travel distances, places of relative safety, and emergency access provisions for fire and rescue services. The ‘stay put’ strategy, while still valid in certain contexts, is subject to rigorous evaluation and communication.
  • External Wall Systems: This is an area of particular scrutiny post-Grenfell. Designers must specify non-combustible materials for external walls and balconies of HRBs, as stipulated by Building Regulations. This requires thorough material selection, detailed assembly designs, and robust certification, ensuring the entire external wall system is compliant and does not contribute to vertical fire spread (farrat.com, 2023).

• Structural Integrity and Robustness: Beyond basic structural stability, designers must now demonstrate an enhanced level of structural robustness, particularly concerning fire scenarios and disproportionate collapse. This involves:

  • Fire Resistance of Structural Elements: Ensuring that critical structural elements (columns, beams, floors) maintain their load-bearing capacity for defined periods under fire conditions, preventing premature collapse.
  • Disproportionate Collapse: Designing the building such that a localised failure (e.g., due to an explosion or impact) does not lead to the collapse of a disproportionately large part of the structure. This often involves the specification of robust connections and alternative load paths.
  • Long-term Durability: Considering the long-term performance and maintenance requirements of structural elements, especially those exposed to environmental degradation or requiring specialist inspection.

• Materials Selection and Certification: The Act places significant emphasis on the diligent selection and rigorous certification of all materials, particularly those integral to fire and structural safety. Designers must:

  • Specify Compliant Materials: Ensure all materials meet relevant fire ratings and structural performance criteria, with a strong preference for non-combustible materials in critical areas.
  • Obtain Manufacturer’s Data: Secure comprehensive technical data, test reports, and third-party certifications for all specified products, verifying their suitability for the intended application.
  • Consider Installation Requirements: Understand and specify the precise installation requirements for materials, as improper installation can negate inherent safety properties.

• Buildability and Maintainability: Designers are now expected to consider how their designs will be safely constructed and how the building will be maintained and inspected throughout its operational life. This includes:

  • Designing for Safe Construction: Minimising hazards during the construction phase through thoughtful design solutions.
  • Designing for Accessibility: Ensuring that safety-critical elements (e.g., fire stopping, structural connections, plant) are accessible for inspection, maintenance, and repair without significant demolition.
  • Digital Design Integration: Utilising Building Information Modelling (BIM) to facilitate the creation and management of the golden thread of information from the earliest design stages, ensuring all design decisions related to safety are captured digitally.

7.2 Construction Practices: Ensuring Quality and Accountability

The construction of HRBs under the Building Safety Act requires stringent adherence to quality control, safety protocols, and meticulous documentation, overseen by competent duty holders.

• Rigorous Quality Assurance and Control: This moves beyond basic compliance to proactive measures throughout the construction process:

  • Inspection and Testing Regimes: Implementing comprehensive inspection and testing plans at critical stages, verified by competent personnel. This includes intrusive inspections of fire stopping, cavity barriers, and cladding interfaces to ensure correct installation.
  • Material Verification: Verifying that materials delivered to site match the specified and approved products, including checks of batch numbers, certifications, and storage conditions.
  • Workmanship Standards: Ensuring that all work, especially safety-critical elements, is carried out to the highest standards of workmanship, meeting design specifications and regulatory requirements. This may involve independent third-party checks.
  • Factory Production Control: For off-site manufactured elements, verifying the quality and conformity of products at the factory stage.

• Safety Protocols and Site Management: Construction sites for HRBs must operate under enhanced safety protocols:

  • CDM Regulations Compliance: Strict adherence to the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015, with Principal Contractors having clear responsibilities for site health and safety.
  • Competence on Site: Ensuring all site personnel, from project managers to operatives, possess the necessary skills, knowledge, experience, and behaviour (SKEB) to perform their roles safely and competently, particularly concerning safety-critical installations.
  • Change Control Procedures: Implementing robust procedures for managing design changes during construction. Any significant deviation from the approved Gateway Two plans must be formally reviewed and, if necessary, re-approved by the BSR, ensuring no compromises to building safety.

• Detailed Documentation and the Golden Thread: This is paramount during construction:

  • Recording ‘As-Built’ Information: Meticulously documenting how the building is constructed, including ‘as-built’ drawings, photographs, inspection reports, and sign-offs for all safety-critical elements. This evidence forms the backbone of the golden thread.
  • Digital Information Management: Utilising digital platforms for capturing, storing, and managing all construction-related safety information, ensuring it is accurate, accessible, and up-to-date.
  • Handover Documentation: Preparing a comprehensive and structured set of handover information for the Accountable Person, including operation and maintenance manuals, commissioning certificates for all systems, and the complete golden thread record. This ensures that the building’s safety information is seamlessly transferred for its operational life (Law Society, 2023).

These implications underscore a fundamental shift from a largely self-regulated, fragmented approach to a highly controlled, auditable, and safety-centric construction process for HRBs, where every stage is scrutinised and documented to ensure the highest levels of safety are achieved and maintained.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

8. Ongoing Management and Compliance

The Building Safety Act 2022 extends its reach far beyond the construction phase, introducing a robust framework for the ongoing management of Higher-Risk Buildings, ensuring their safety throughout their operational lifespan. This framework centres on the critical role of the Accountable Person and proactive resident engagement.

8.1 The Accountable Person (AP) and Principal Accountable Person (PAP)

The Act introduces the statutory role of the ‘Accountable Person’ (AP) as the primary duty holder responsible for the ongoing safety of occupied HRBs. For buildings with more than one AP, a ‘Principal Accountable Person’ (PAP) must be appointed.

8.1.1 Who Can Be an Accountable Person?

An Accountable Person is typically an organisation or individual who owns or has responsibility for the repair and maintenance of the common parts of an HRB. This could include:

• Freeholders or Landlords: Often the ultimate owner of the building.
• Management Companies: Companies appointed to manage the building on behalf of the freeholder or leaseholders.
• Right to Manage (RTM) Companies: Companies formed by leaseholders to take over the management of their building.
• Commonhold Associations: In commonhold developments.

In buildings with multiple Accountable Persons (e.g., where different parts of a building are owned by different entities), one must be designated as the Principal Accountable Person (PAP). The PAP takes on overarching responsibility for building safety for the whole structure, requiring coordination with other APs (Law Society, 2023).

8.1.2 Extensive Duties of the Accountable Person

The duties of the AP are comprehensive and legally binding, designed to ensure continuous proactive management of building safety risks. These duties include:

• Risk Assessment and Management: Regularly assessing and managing building safety risks, specifically fire spread and structural collapse, in relation to the whole building and its occupants. This is a continuous process, not a one-off event.
• Safety Case Report Preparation and Maintenance: Preparing a detailed safety case report that identifies all fire and structural hazards, assesses the risks, details the measures taken to mitigate those risks, and outlines the safety management systems in place. This report must be kept up-to-date and submitted to the BSR when requested (Law Society, 2023).
• Operating the ‘Golden Thread’: Taking ownership of the golden thread of information from the client upon completion of the building and ensuring it is accurately maintained, updated, and accessible throughout the building’s operational life. This involves managing updates after maintenance, repairs, or refurbishments.
• Producing a Resident Engagement Strategy: Developing and implementing a clear strategy for informing and engaging residents on building safety matters.
• Providing Safety Information to Residents: Ensuring residents have access to crucial safety information, including emergency procedures, fire safety instructions, and details of the Accountable Person.
• Establishing Mandatory Reporting Systems: Putting in place systems for residents and others to report building safety concerns, and demonstrating how these concerns are addressed.
• Cooperation and Coordination: For buildings with multiple APs, the PAP must ensure effective cooperation and coordination between all parties to manage risks across the entire building.
• Demonstrating Compliance to the BSR: Providing evidence to the BSR upon request that all duties are being fulfilled, including submitting the safety case report and other relevant documentation.
• Implementing a Safety Management System: Establishing and maintaining robust safety management systems, policies, procedures, and clear lines of responsibility to ensure ongoing building safety compliance.

8.1.3 Legal Liabilities and Sanctions

Failure to comply with the duties of an Accountable Person can lead to severe legal consequences, including significant fines, enforcement notices, and, in serious cases, criminal prosecution for individuals. This underscores the gravity of the role and the personal responsibility it entails, necessitating a high level of competence and diligence from anyone undertaking the AP function.

8.2 Resident Engagement Strategy

The Act places a strong emphasis on empowering residents and ensuring their active involvement in building safety. This is a direct response to the failings identified by the Grenfell Inquiry, where residents’ concerns were often overlooked (Law Society, 2023).

8.2.1 Importance and Scope

Engaging with residents is crucial not only for communication but also for fostering a shared responsibility for safety. The AP must develop and implement a comprehensive ‘Resident Engagement Strategy’ that covers:

• Providing Comprehensive Safety Information: Clearly communicating critical safety information, including the building’s fire safety strategy, evacuation procedures, details of safety equipment, and emergency contact information, in an accessible format.
• Establishing Clear Communication Channels: Setting up effective and transparent channels for residents to raise building safety concerns, ask questions, and provide feedback to the AP and BSR.
• Explaining Decision-Making: Transparently explaining decisions made regarding building safety risks and how resident feedback has been considered.
• Informing about Building Safety Work: Keeping residents informed about planned building safety works, their purpose, and their impact.
• Consultation on Safety Case Report: Engaging residents in the development and review of the safety case report, particularly regarding the identification and mitigation of risks that directly affect them.
• Resident Responsibilities: Clearly communicating residents’ responsibilities in maintaining building safety, such as not tampering with safety equipment, reporting issues, and understanding evacuation procedures.

8.2.2 Proactive Engagement and Feedback

The strategy must be proactive, not merely reactive. It should aim to gather resident feedback to identify potential safety concerns, improve safety measures, and ensure that residents feel heard and valued as partners in building safety. The BSR will scrutinise these strategies and the AP’s implementation, expecting demonstrable evidence of genuine and effective engagement.

8.3 Ongoing Oversight by BSR

The BSR’s role does not cease once a completion certificate is issued. It maintains continuous oversight of occupied HRBs, ensuring the Accountable Person is fulfilling their duties.

• Periodic Reviews and Audits: The BSR will periodically call in safety case reports for review and may conduct audits and inspections of HRBs to verify the information provided by the AP and assess on-the-ground safety management.
• Powers to Request Information: The BSR has extensive powers to request any information from the AP or other relevant parties that it deems necessary to fulfil its functions.
• Compliance and Enforcement: If the BSR identifies non-compliance or inadequate risk management, it can issue enforcement notices, requiring remedial action within a specified timeframe. Failure to comply can lead to further penalties, including criminal prosecution.

This continuous regulatory oversight ensures that building safety remains a living, active priority for the entire operational life of an HRB, fostering a culture of perpetual vigilance and improvement.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

9. Legal and Compliance Challenges and Opportunities

The introduction of the Building Safety Act 2022 represents a seismic shift in the UK’s built environment sector, presenting both significant challenges and new opportunities for professionals and organisations involved with Higher-Risk Buildings.

9.1 Regulatory Complexity and Interpretation

9.1.1 Navigating the New Landscape

Professionals across the industry – including developers, architects, engineers, contractors, building control bodies, fire safety specialists, and building managers – face the immediate challenge of navigating a complex and evolving regulatory landscape. The Act itself is enabling legislation, with much of its detail prescribed through secondary legislation and updated Approved Documents. This layered regulatory framework necessitates a deep and continuous understanding of:

• New Statutory Duties: Understanding the expanded roles and responsibilities of clients, principal designers, principal contractors, and accountable persons.
• Technical Guidance: Interpreting new and updated Approved Documents, British Standards, and industry guidance that support the Act.
• Phased Implementation: Keeping abreast of the phased rollout of different provisions of the Act and associated regulations, which have come into force at various times since April 2022 (thecompliancepeople.co.uk, 2023).

This complexity demands specialist legal and technical advice and a proactive approach to continuous professional development.

9.1.2 Documentation and the Golden Thread

The requirement for the ‘golden thread’ of information presents a substantial documentation challenge. Ensuring that all required documentation is accurately created, meticulously maintained, stored digitally, and made accessible at every stage of a building’s lifecycle requires significant investment in:

• Digital Systems and Software: Implementing robust common data environments, BIM platforms, and information management systems capable of handling vast amounts of complex data.
• Data Standards and Protocols: Establishing consistent data input standards across multiple stakeholders to ensure interoperability and data quality.
• Legacy Data: For existing HRBs, the challenge includes retrospectively collating and digitalising existing records to form a foundational golden thread, which can be an immense task.

9.2 Competence and Capacity

The Act places competence at its heart, demanding demonstrable skills, knowledge, experience, and behaviour (SKEB) from individuals and robust organisational capability from firms. This creates both a challenge and an opportunity for the industry.

9.2.1 Upskilling and Recruitment

• Industry-wide Training: A significant investment in upskilling the existing workforce across all disciplines is required to meet the new competence requirements. This includes training in new processes, digital tools, and a deeper understanding of building safety principles.
• Specialist Skills Shortages: There is an existing shortage of highly competent professionals in areas such as fire safety engineering, structural engineering, building control, and digital information management. The Act will exacerbate this demand, potentially leading to recruitment challenges and increased costs.
• Accreditation and Certification: The industry needs to develop and adopt recognised competence frameworks, certification schemes, and professional registers to provide assurance to the BSR and clients.

9.2.2 Professional Indemnity Insurance

The increased liabilities and focus on competence have profoundly impacted the professional indemnity (PI) insurance market. Insurers have become more cautious, leading to:

• Higher Premiums: Significantly increased PI insurance premiums for firms involved in HRB projects.
• Exclusions: More restrictive terms, with common exclusions for external wall systems and fire safety design work, making it challenging for firms to secure adequate cover.
• Impact on Supply Chain: Smaller firms and individual consultants may struggle to secure or afford necessary insurance, potentially limiting the available supply chain for HRB projects (thecompliancepeople.co.uk, 2023).

9.3 Cost and Investment

The implementation of the Building Safety Act requires significant financial investment across the sector.

• For Developers and Clients: Increased costs associated with more rigorous design processes, enhanced quality assurance during construction, the implementation of digital golden thread systems, and potentially longer project timelines due to gateway approvals.
• For Building Owners and Accountable Persons: Substantial costs for remediating existing HRBs with fire safety defects (e.g., cladding removal and replacement), developing and maintaining safety case reports, implementing resident engagement strategies, and managing the ongoing golden thread. While government funding is available for some cladding remediation, a significant financial burden remains.
• Long-Term Economic Benefits: Despite the upfront costs, the long-term economic benefits include enhanced asset value, reduced insurance premiums once compliance is proven, prevention of future tragedies, and improved public confidence in high-rise living.

9.4 Cultural Shift and Collaboration

Perhaps the most profound impact of the Act is the demand for a fundamental cultural shift within the industry, moving away from a ‘race to the bottom’ to a ‘race to the top’ for building safety.

• Safety-First Ethos: Embedding a proactive, safety-first ethos across all organisational levels, from executive leadership to site operatives.
• Increased Collaboration: The interconnected nature of the duty holder roles and the golden thread necessitates unprecedented levels of collaboration, communication, and transparency across the supply chain, fostering a more integrated industry.
• Greater Transparency: The Act promotes greater transparency with regulators and residents, building trust and accountability.

9.5 Opportunities for Innovation

While challenging, the Act also presents opportunities:

• Digitalisation: Driving innovation in digital construction technologies, data management, and building information modelling.
• Product Innovation: Encouraging the development of safer, more sustainable, and rigorously tested construction products and systems.
• Professional Development: Creating new specialisms and career paths in building safety management, fire engineering, and digital compliance.
• Enhanced Reputation: Companies that embrace and excel under the new regime can build a stronger reputation for quality, safety, and reliability.

Overall, the Building Safety Act demands a transformation of practice, culture, and competence. While the path to full compliance is complex and resource-intensive, the imperative to prevent another tragedy like Grenfell provides a powerful motivation for the industry to meet these challenges and seize the opportunities for a safer future.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

10. International Comparisons

The Grenfell Tower fire and the subsequent Building Safety Act have placed the UK at the forefront of legislative reform in building safety. However, examining approaches in other jurisdictions provides valuable context and insights into global best practices and shared challenges.

10.1 Diverse Global Approaches to High-Rise Safety

Building safety regulations vary significantly across countries, often shaped by local building practices, climatic conditions, cultural contexts, and historical incidents. Key areas of divergence and convergence include:

• Germany and European Union: Many European countries, including Germany, operate under a more prescriptive regulatory system compared to the UK’s previous functional approach. This often involves stringent requirements for material fire ratings, extensive use of non-combustible materials in external facades, and robust fire compartmentation standards. The EU’s Construction Products Regulation (CPR) aims to harmonise standards across member states, though national derogations exist.

• Australia: Australia, particularly after the Lacrosse Tower fire in Melbourne (2014) involving combustible cladding, has also undertaken significant reforms. Its approach includes strict limitations on combustible materials in external facades, a focus on fire engineering solutions, and substantial government-led remediation programs for affected buildings. The Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB) continually updates the National Construction Code (NCC) to incorporate lessons learned from incidents.

• United States: The US adopts a model code system (e.g., International Building Code, International Fire Code) developed by the International Code Council (ICC), which jurisdictions then adopt and amend. This often includes requirements for sprinklers in high-rise buildings, fire-rated construction, and detailed emergency planning. The variability across states and cities can be a challenge, but the emphasis on active fire protection is strong.

• United Arab Emirates (UAE): Rapid high-rise development in the UAE has led to a focus on fire safety, particularly after several fires involving external cladding (e.g., The Torch, Dubai). The UAE Civil Defence has introduced stringent new fire and life safety codes, requiring non-combustible cladding, advanced fire detection, and robust evacuation strategies. Their approach is often prescriptive, with a strong emphasis on continuous inspection and enforcement.

10.2 Lessons Learned and Shared Challenges

While approaches differ, several common themes and challenges emerge globally:

• The Cladding Crisis: Many countries have grappled with the issue of combustible cladding on existing high-rise buildings, leading to complex and costly remediation programmes, often involving difficult questions of responsibility and funding.
• Competence and Certification: Ensuring that all professionals involved in building design, construction, and inspection possess verifiable competence is a universal challenge. There is a growing international movement towards robust competence frameworks and professional accreditation.
• Information Management: The challenge of maintaining accurate, accessible, and up-to-date building information throughout a building’s lifecycle is not unique to the UK. Concepts akin to the ‘golden thread’ are being explored or implemented in various forms globally to improve transparency and accountability.
• Regulatory Oversight and Enforcement: The balance between prescriptive rules and performance-based approaches, and the effectiveness of regulatory bodies in enforcing compliance, remains a constant point of discussion and reform worldwide.
• Resident Engagement: Increasingly, jurisdictions are recognising the importance of empowering residents and ensuring their involvement in building safety matters, acknowledging their unique position as occupants and first responders in an emergency.

The UK’s Building Safety Act, with its BSR-led gateway system, golden thread, and explicit Accountable Person duties, represents one of the most comprehensive and integrated responses to these challenges. By learning from international experience and sharing its own evolving best practices, the UK can contribute to a global uplift in high-rise building safety standards.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

11. Conclusion

The establishment of the Building Safety Regulator and the comprehensive implementation of the Building Safety Act 2022 represent not merely a legislative update, but a profound and necessary transformation in the UK’s approach to the safety of higher-risk buildings. Born from the tragic lessons of Grenfell Tower and the incisive recommendations of the Hackitt Review, this Act meticulously addresses deep-seated systemic failures by instilling a culture of accountability, competence, and continuous safety management across the built environment.

The detailed definition of Higher-Risk Buildings, coupled with the rigorous three-gateway system, ensures that safety is designed in from the earliest planning stages, rigorously verified during construction, and confirmed before occupation. The ‘golden thread’ of information mandates an unprecedented level of transparency and data management, providing a perpetual, accessible record of a building’s safety credentials. Crucially, the introduction of clearly defined duty holders, from the client to the Accountable Person, ensures that responsibility for building safety is no longer fragmented but is explicitly owned and managed throughout a building’s entire lifecycle.

However, the effectiveness of these groundbreaking measures will hinge on several critical factors: the rigorous and proportionate enforcement capabilities of the BSR, the continuous commitment of all professionals to upskill and embed a safety-first culture, and the active, empowered engagement of residents who are, ultimately, the primary beneficiaries of these reforms. The journey towards full compliance and cultural shift is not without its challenges, including navigating regulatory complexity, addressing competence gaps, and managing significant financial investments across the industry. Yet, these challenges are outweighed by the moral and societal imperative to prevent future tragedies and to foster genuine confidence in the safety of high-rise living.

The Building Safety Act 2022 heralds a new era, shifting from a focus on mere ‘building regulations’ as a one-off compliance exercise to a holistic, dynamic, and continuous process of ‘building safety management’. Ongoing vigilance, adaptation to emerging risks, and a sustained commitment from all stakeholders are essential to ensure that the profound lessons learned from past tragedies are not merely remembered, but are perpetually acted upon, securing safer homes and communities for generations to come.

Many thanks to our sponsor Focus 360 Energy who helped us prepare this research report.

References

• Building Safety Act 2022. (2022). UK Government.
• Building Safety Regulator. (2023). GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/building-safety-regulator
• brighthr.com. (2023). UK Fire Safety Regulations 2023. BrightHR.
• communities.lawsociety.org.uk. (2023). Heightened risk | Feature | Communities – The Law Society.
• Coroners’ Inquest, Lakanal House. (2013). Narrative Verdict.
• designingbuildings.co.uk. (2023a). Higher-risk building. Designing Buildings.
• designingbuildings.co.uk. (2023b). Higher risk buildings definition 2023. Designing Buildings.
• en.wikipedia.org. (2023). Building Act 1984. Wikipedia.
• en.wikipedia.org. (2023). Building control body. Wikipedia.
• en.wikipedia.org. (2023). Grenfell Tower fire. Wikipedia.
• en.wikipedia.org. (2023). Shirley Towers fire. Wikipedia.
• farrat.com. (2023). Structural Thermal Breaks & Building Safety Act 2022, Farrat UK.
• gov.uk. (2023c). Criteria for determining whether an existing building is a higher-risk building during building work. GOV.UK.
• gov.uk. (2023b). Buildings included in the new, more stringent regulatory regime (factsheet). GOV.UK.
• gov.uk. (2023a). Building Safety Act: Gateway One – applying for planning permission. GOV.UK.
• Grenfell Tower Inquiry. (2018-2023). Reports and Hearings.
• Hackitt, J. (2018). Building a Safer Future: Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report. Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government.
• House of Commons Library. (2022). Building safety: the Building Safety Act 2022. Briefing Paper Number 8646.
• HSE. (2024). Building Safety Regulator. Health and Safety Executive.
• Law Society. (2023). Heightened risk. Communities – The Law Society.
• Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government. (2020). Building a Safer Future: An Implementation Plan for Building Safety Regulatory Reform. HM Government.
• thecompliancepeople.co.uk. (2023). Changes to building safety regulations – new legislation explained. The Compliance People.